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BLD-124        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






KENNETH J. TAGGART, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND 





THE HONORABLE JEFFREY S. SALTZ, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY;  
THE HONORABLE FRANCESCO OTT, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY;  
THE HONORABLE ANN LAZARUS, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY; 
HONORABLE SUSAN PIKES GANTMAN, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY; 
WELLS FARGO BANK NA; PHELAN HALLINAN & SCHMIEG LLP,  
AND ANY SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST; REED SMITH LLP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-01638) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 18, 2021 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 






* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




PER CURIAM   
Kenneth Taggart, proceeding pro se, appeals orders of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his amended complaint and 
denying his motion for reconsideration.  Although we disagree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that Taggart’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we will 
summarily affirm its judgment on other grounds.  
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a foreclosure action against Taggart in the 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.  On March 27, 2018, Judge 
Jeffrey Saltz entered a judgment in favor of Wells Fargo.  The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed on August 1, 2019.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Taggart’s 
petition for allowance of appeal on April 14, 2020, and his motion for reconsideration on 
May 19, 2020. 
 On March 26, 2020, while his petition for allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court was pending, Taggart filed a complaint in the District Court against Judge 
Saltz, Pennsylvania Superior Court Judges Paula Ott, Anne Lazarus, and Susan Peikes 
Gantman, who affirmed Judge Saltz’s decision, Wells Fargo, and two law firms.  In an 
amended complaint, Taggart claimed that the judges, through their decisions, violated his 
rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and sought declaratory 
relief.  Taggart also claimed that Wells Fargo and the two law firms committed fraud, 
abused the judicial process, and maliciously prosecuted him.  He sought money damages 




The District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended 
complaint.  The District Court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
Taggart’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1  It also ruled that, even if 
it had jurisdiction, Taggart did not state a claim for declaratory relief and his claims were 
barred by collateral estoppel.2  The District Court denied his motion for leave to file a 
second amended complaint and his motion for reconsideration.  This appeal followed.    
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order dismissing the amended complaint.  Great W. Mining & Min. 
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review the denial of 
Taggart’s motion to file a second amended complaint and his motion for reconsideration 
for abuse of discretion.  Id.   
As recognized by the District Court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal 
courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims when “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in  
state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court  
 
1 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923). 
 
2 The District Court also noted that Taggart purported to file suit on behalf of himself and 





judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great 
W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).    
 Although the District Court concluded that these requirements were satisfied, at 
least one of them – that the state court judgment was rendered before the federal suit was 
filed – is not met.  As noted above, Taggart filed his complaint in the District Court while 
his petition for allowance of appeal was pending in state court.  Absent a final judgment 
in the state court proceedings, Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable.  See Parker v. Lyons, 757 
F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“. . . all federal circuits that have addressed 
the issue have concluded that Rooker-Feldman does not apply if, as here, a state-court 
appeal is pending when the federal suit is filed”); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 
1032 (10th Cir. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman inapplicable where federal suit was filed while 
petition for certiorari in the state supreme court was pending); see also Malhan v. Sec’y 
U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 460 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding in case involving an 
interlocutory order “that Rooker-Feldman does not apply when state proceedings have 
neither ended nor led to orders reviewable by the United States Supreme Court”).  The 
District Court thus had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Taggart’s complaint. 
We agree, however, with the District Court’s alternative conclusion that Taggart’s 
claims fail on other grounds.  Taggart asserts in his amended complaint that Judge Saltz 
and the Superior Court judges ignored the evidence and misapplied the law and that their 




the District Court to compel Judge Saltz to adjudicate his foreclosure action consistent 
with the evidence, see Am. Compl., Count IV, and to declare that the judges violated his 
rights by incorrectly deciding the foreclosure action.  See Am. Compl., Counts I-III, VII-
XII, XXV-XXX.  Taggart also alleges that Judge Saltz retaliated against him for prior 
lawsuits that he had filed and asks the District Court to declare that the judgment was 
entered in retaliation.  See Am. Compl, Counts V, VI.     
 A declaratory judgment is available to define the legal rights of parties, not to 
adjudicate past conduct where there is no threat of continuing harm.  Waller v. Hanlon, 
922 F.3d 590, 603 (5th Cir. 2019).  Absent such a threat, Article III standing is lacking.  
Id.; see also St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n, Inc. v. Gov’t of U.S. V.I., 218 
F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2000) (standing exists when “‘there is a substantial controversy, 
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”) (citations omitted). 
The declaratory relief that Taggart seeks implicates the prior handling of the 
foreclosure action.  The judicial defendants’ conduct that is the subject of the complaint 
has ended.  Taggart also does not seek relief against parties who have legal interests 
adverse to his own.  The District Court did not err in dismissing these claims.  Although 
Count IV does not seek declaratory relief, it is subject to dismissal for the same reason as 
the remaining counts of Taggart’s amended complaint discussed below. 
 The remaining counts assert fraud and other state law violations by Wells Fargo 
and the law firm defendants and are all based on alleged false statements in state court 




Judge Saltz’s judgment and seeks $40,000,000 against each of these defendants for each 
fraudulent claim made.  See Am. Compl., Counts XIII-XXIV.  Collateral estoppel bars 
these claims.  As the District Court explained, Judge Saltz rejected Taggart’s contention 
that Wells Fargo lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action because it did not own 
the mortgage.  Taggart’s amended complaint reflects that he disagrees that the evidence 
in state court supported a finding that Wells Fargo owned the mortgage.  He may not re-
litigate this issue.  See Del. River Port Auth. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, 290 F.3d 567, 
572 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a court’s determination on an issue necessary to support 
its judgment is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a cause of action involving a 
party to the prior litigation). 
We also conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Taggart’s motion 
for leave to file a second amended complaint as the claims in that complaint fail for the 
reasons stated above.  Finally, the District Court did not err in denying Taggart’s motion 
for reconsideration.  Although we do not uphold the dismissal based on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, Taggart did not show that he satisfied the standard for reconsideration. 
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
